University of Miami Race & Social Justice Law Review
Volume 11

Issue 1

Article 4

November 2020

Good for Thee, but Not for Me: How Bisexuals are Overlooked in
Title VII Sexual Orientation Arguments
Michael Conklin
Angelo State University

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umrsjlr
Part of the Law and Race Commons, and the Law and Society Commons

Recommended Citation
Michael Conklin, Good for Thee, but Not for Me: How Bisexuals are Overlooked in Title VII Sexual
Orientation Arguments, 11 U. Miami Race & Soc. Just. L. Rev. 33 (2020)
Available at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umrsjlr/vol11/iss1/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Miami School of Law
Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Race & Social Justice Law Review
by an authorized editor of University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository. For more information, please
contact library@law.miami.edu.

Good for Thee, but Not for Me: How
Bisexuals are Overlooked in Title VII
Sexual Orientation Arguments
Michael Conklin*
I. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................... 34
II. RELEVANT BISEXUAL HISTORY ......................................................... 35
III. RELEVANT TITLE VII HISTORY ......................................................... 42
IV. DISCRIMINATION “BECAUSE OF . . . SEX”......................................... 44
V. GENDER STEREOTYPING DISCRIMINATION ........................................ 46
VI. ASSOCIATIONAL DISCRIMINATION ................................................... 48
VII. CONCLUSION ................................................................................... 51

*
Powell Endowed Professor of Business Law, Norris-Vincent College of Business,
Angelo State University. I would like to especially thank Professor Carroll Multz for his
invaluable insight into the researching and publishing of this Article. I would also like to
thank the editors of the University of Miami Race and Social Justice Law Review for their
input regarding the improvement of this Article.

33

34

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI RACE & SOCIAL JUSTICE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 11:1

I. INTRODUCTION
Legal scholars frequently refer to Title VII protections for LGBT
individuals. However, their examples and legal theories invariably focus
on protections for lesbian, gay, and transgender individuals to the
exclusion of bisexual individuals.1 The three Title VII cases heard by the
Supreme Court on October 8, 2019, are illustrative of this point. Two
involve the issue of discrimination against a gay employee (Bostock v.
Clayton County and Altitude Express v. Zarda),2 and the other involves
discrimination against a transsexual employee (R.G. & G.R. Harris
Funeral Homes, Inc. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission).3 In
the two hours of oral arguments for these three cases, the word “bisexual”
was never mentioned. Even the acronym “LGBT”—in which the “B”
stands for bisexuals—was never mentioned. The petitioner’s attorney in
Bostock explicitly disagreed with interpreting Title VII to “encompass
sexual orientation discrimination.”4
Despite claims that a Supreme Court decision in favor of Bostock
would provide protections to employees discriminated against based on
their sexual orientation, an evaluation of the arguments in Bostock casts
serious doubt on how they would affect a future case involving a similarly

1

See, e.g., Ronald Turner, Title VII and the Unenvisaged Case: Is Anti-LGBTQ
Discrimination Unlawful Sex Discrimination?, 95 IND. L.J. 227 (2020). “[T]he question
posed in this Article [is]: Is anti-LGBTQ discrimination prohibited by Title VII’s
discrimination ‘because of sex’ proscription?” Id. at 268. However, the only time Turner’s
Article makes reference to bisexuality is in footnotes defining the acronym LGBT. Id. at
229 n.14, 254, n.202. In conducting research for this Article, this author did not see a single
example in any law review article of how Title VII might affect a bisexual claimant.
2
Bostock v. Clayton Cty., No. 17-13801 (U.S. docketed June 1, 2018); Altitude
Express v. Zarda, No. 15-3775 (U.S. docketed June 1, 2018). The two cases have been
consolidated.
3
R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc. v. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, No.
16-2424 (U.S. docketed July 24, 2018).
4
Oral Argument at 3:44, Bostock, No. 17-13801, https://www.oyez.org/cases/2019/171618. After explicitly disagreeing with interpreting Title VII to “encompass sexual
orientation discrimination,” the petitioner’s attorney presented the following sex-based
Title VII standard—which clearly applies to gays and lesbians but not necessarily to
bisexuals:
Title VII was intended to make sure that men were not disadvantaged
relative to women and women were not disadvantaged relative to men.
And when you tell two employees who come in both of whom tell you
they married their partner Bill last weekend, when you fire the male
employee who married Bill and give the female employee who married
Bill a couple of days off to celebrate the joyous event that’s
discrimination because of sex.
Id. at 4:15.
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situated bisexual plaintiff.5 Part II of this Article looks at the relevant
history of bisexuality, in particular their treatment in society and under the
law when compared to heterosexuals and homosexuals. Part III provides
an overview of the relevant Title VII history. The remainder of the Article
evaluates the three arguments presented by petitioners in Bostock in favor
of extending Title VII protections to gay and lesbian individuals, and
assesses their likely effectiveness when applied to protecting bisexual
individuals from employment discrimination. Part IV covers
discrimination “because of . . . sex.”6 Part V covers Price Waterhouse
gender stereotyping,7 and Part VI covers claims of associational
discrimination.8 It is the aim of this Article to present the arguments in a
neutral manner, rather than engaging in advocacy for a personally desired
outcome.

II. RELEVANT BISEXUAL HISTORY
This section presents the historical context for treatment of bisexual
individuals by—and compared to—heterosexuals and homosexuals, and
how this results in bisexual erasure. This includes analysis of how
bisexuals are treated by society in general and how they are treated under
the law.
Despite being more than half of all LGBT individuals in the United
States, 9 bisexual individuals have a long history of being ignored, even by
fellow LGBT advocates.10 The first national gay rights organization was
founded in 1951.11 The first national lesbian rights organization was
founded in 1955.12 It was not until 1983 that the first bisexual political
organization was formed.13 During the AIDS epidemic in the 1980s,
5

While the term is somewhat amorphous, for the purposes of this Article, the term
“bisexual” is defined as “of, relating to, or characterized by a tendency to be sexually
attracted toward individuals of both sexes . . ..” See infra note 104.
6
Brief for Petitioner at 13, Bostock v. Clayton County, No. 17-13801 (2018).
7
Id. at 17, 27.
8
Id. at 19.
9
GLAAD, REPORTING ON THE BISEXUAL COMMUNITY: A RESOURCE FOR JOURNALISTS
AND MEDIA PROFESSIONALS 9 (2016), https://www.glaad.org/sites/default/files/Bi
MediaResourceGuide.pdf.
10
Id. (“Despite making up a large portion of the LGBT community, the bisexual
community and the issues bi people face are often under- and misreported.”)
11
The
American
Gay
Rights
Movement:
A
Timeline,
INFOPLEASE,
https://www.infoplease.com/history/pride-month/the-american-gay-rights-movement-atimeline (last updated Feb. 11, 2017).
12
Id.
13
Miranda Rosenblum, The U.S. Bisexual+ Movement: A #BiWeek History Lesson,
GLAAD (Sept. 22, 2017), https://www.glaad.org/blog/us-bisexual-movement-biweekhistory-lesson.
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bisexual men were portrayed as “the ultimate pariahs.”14 Bisexual
individuals are often mislabeled as either gay or lesbian, and their
historical contributions to the LGBT movement are often overlooked.15
Out of the $487 million provided to LGBT programs and organizations
from 1970 to 2010, only $84,000 went to organizations that specifically
serve the bisexual community.16 Bisexual individuals are vastly
underreported in media coverage. The ratio of references to
“homosexuality” and “bisexuality” in major newspapers is greater than
20:1, despite bisexual individuals making up most of the LGBT
community.17
Bisexual erasure is described as “the lack of acknowledgment and
ignoring of the clear evidence that bisexuals exist.”18 This, in turn, leads
to bisexual invisibility. It is posited that bisexual erasure is the result of a
shared interest from both heterosexuals and homosexuals to suppress
bisexuality.19 In the seminal work on the subject, three interests for
bisexual erasure shared by heterosexuals and homosexuals are defined as
“(1) an interest in the stability of sexual orientation categories; (2) an
interest in the primacy of sex as a diacritical characteristic; and (3) an
interest in the preservation of monogamy.”20
Bisexual erasure is likely an underlying cause for the poor health
outcomes in the bisexual community.21 This is because bisexuality is
rarely discussed—and therefore rarely understood—by medical
professionals and researchers.22 As a result, the medical community lacks
bi-inclusive resources on sexual health.23 Experts conclude that biphobia
is likely responsible for lower rates of preventative care in bisexual
women.24 This results in higher rates of breast cancer, heart disease, and
14

Id.
Id.
16
Zachary Zane, In the LGBT Community, Bisexual People Have More Health Risks.
Here’s What Could Help, WASH. POST (Sept. 25, 2017), https://www.washington
post.com/news/soloish/wp/2017/09/25/in-the-lgbt-community-bisexual-people-havemore-health-risks-heres-what-could-help/.
17
Kenji Yoshino, The Epistemic Contract of Bisexual Erasure, 52 STAN. L. REV. 353,
368 (2000).
18
Bisexual Erasure, GLAAD, https://www.glaad.org/accordionview/bisexual-erasure
(last visited May 7, 2020).
19
Yoshino, supra note 17, at 391–92.
20
Id. at 399.
21
Health Disparities Among Bisexual People, HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN FOUND.,
https://assets2.hrc.org/files/assets/resources/HRC-BiHealthBrief.pdf (last visited May 6,
2020).
22
Id.
23
Id.
24
Id. (“Negative experiences in healthcare settings can lead bisexual people to delay
health care visits, change healthcare providers, avoid disclosing their sexuality in
15
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obesity.25 Biphobia is also likely responsible for disproportionate HIV
rates in bisexual men due to less testing.26
Despite relatively rapid advances in rights for gay and lesbian
individuals, bisexual acceptance has not experienced the same growth.27
Bisexual men and women experience poverty at higher rates than both
their straight or gay counterparts.28 They are also more likely to be
unemployed or have more mental health issues.29 Bisexual individuals are
significantly less likely than gay and lesbian individuals to feel
comfortable coming out as bisexual.30 Some even choose to identify as gay
or lesbian to avoid discrimination and to avoid unpleasant conversations
regarding bisexual skepticism.31 Bisexual individuals are more likely than
gay and lesbian individuals to participate in self-harm, including suicide.32
Sometimes bisexual individuals have to deal with the unpleasant
undertaking of being confronted by people who deny the very existence of
their sexual orientation.33 This challenge can even come from inside the
LGBT community.34 The belief that bisexuality does not exist as a
subsequent interactions with providers and rely on internet sources rather than a doctor for
health information.”).
25
Id.
26
Id.
27
GLAAD, supra note 9, at 3 (“The past few years have seen a surge of acceptance for
the LGBT community, but acceptance for bisexual people continues to lag behind.”).
28
Shabab Ahmed Mirza, Disaggregating the Data for Bisexual People, CTR. FOR AM.
PROGRESS
(Sept.
24,
2018),
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/lgbtqrights/reports/2018/09/24/458472/disaggregating-data-bisexual-people/.
29
Id.
30
Ann E. Tweedy & Karen Yescavage, Employment Discrimination Against Bisexuals:
An Empirical Study, 21 WM. & MARY J. OF WOMEN & L. 699, 704 (2015) (“[B]isexuals
were less than half as likely as gays and lesbians to have told most or all of the important
people in their lives about their sexual orientations, and a 2013 survey of employees in
Britain revealed that bisexuals are only roughly one third as likely as gays and lesbians to
feel comfortable being out in the workplace. And, this reluctance to come out contributes
to feelings of dissatisfaction at work.”).
31
Benoit Denizet-Lewis, The Scientific Quest to Prove Bisexuality Exists, N.Y. TIMES
MAGAZINE (Mar. 20, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/23/magazine/thescientific-quest-to-prove-bisexuality-exists.html (giving the example of a bisexual man
who chooses to identify as gay, who explains that “there are a host of emotional reasons
why I choose to identify as gay. For one thing, it simplifies my life”).
32
Health Disparities Among Bisexual People, supra note 21.
33
Zachary Zane, Bisexual People Have Long Felt Excluded at Pride Festivities.
Changing,
WASH.
POST
(June
7,
That’s Finally
2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/2019/06/07/bisexual-peoplehave-long-felt-excluded-pride-festivities-thats-finally-changing/ (providing the example
of a bisexual man who attended a gay pride march and was harassed by gay men who
asserted he would leave his girlfriend and come out as gay by the end of the day).
34
Id.
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legitimate sexual orientation is often rooted in the false notion that sexual
orientation is binary—people are either homosexual or heterosexual.35
Therefore, bisexual individuals are simply confused as to which of the two
they are.36 Consistent with this binary view of sexual orientation, bisexual
men report harassment from gay men regarding how they should quit
riding the fence and come out as fully gay.37 It has been hypothesized that
perhaps the reason bisexual individuals are viewed negatively by some gay
and lesbian individuals is because they have the privilege of “passing” as
straight.38
A majority of bisexual individuals report being the victim of
employment discrimination.39 The most common reason provided for why
a bisexual employee did not file a complaint for the employment
discrimination experienced was because they did not think they would get
the assistance they needed.40 Unfortunately, this hopeless mindset is
supported by research. A 2015 study found that out of all the electronically
available employment discrimination case law, bisexual plaintiffs have yet
to win a single case on the merits.41 Additionally, bisexual individuals are
also disproportionately people of color.42 This results in an increased
vulnerability to further disparities related to racism and biphobia.43
Internet searches also demonstrate the different level of attention
bisexual causes receive when compared to gay and lesbian causes. A
Google search for “gay rights” returns more than nine times as many
results as a search for “bisexual rights.”44 The disparity is even more
35
GLAAD, supra note 9, at 4 (discussing a study about how bisexual people reported
they “avoided coming out because they didn’t want to deal with misconceptions that
bisexuals were indecisive or incapable of monogamy”).
36
Id.
37Zane, supra note 33.
38
Id. (quoting Ian Lawrence-Tourinho, director of the American Institute of Bisexuality,
who said, “So there’s a bit of resentment toward bi people because they still have a foot—
so to speak—in the straight world”).
39
Tweedy & Yescavage, supra note 30, at 724.
40
Id. at 735 (excluding the response of “other”).
41
Id. at 717.
42
Health Disparities Among Bisexual People, supra note 21. ("Moreover,
(transgender people and people of color comprise large portions of the bisexual
community – with more than 40 percent of LGBT people of color identifying as
bisexual . . . .” (emphasis omitted)).
43
Id.
44
In Google searches performed on May 7, 2020, “Bisexual rights”
returned approximately 93.5 million results, while “gay rights” returned approximately
812 million results.
Compare
Bisexual
Rights
–
Google
Search,
GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/search?q=bisexual+rights (last visited May
14, 2020) [https://perma.cc/X3US-H5G9], with Gay Rights – Google
Search, GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/search?q=gay+rights
(last
visited
May
14,
2020)
[https://perma.cc/BZK7-L5N2].
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severe in the area of law. Similarly, a Westlaw search for “gay rights”
returns more than eighty times as many cases as a search for “bisexual
rights.”45
In addition to worse health outcomes, higher unemployment, less
media coverage, and the burden of dealing with “double discrimination,”46
including people who deny the very existence of bisexuality as a sexual
orientation, bisexual individuals also face unequal treatment in the legal
system. This often manifests in some form of not viewing bisexual
individuals as legitimate members in the LGBT community. Relevant to
the topic of Title VII protections, the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission’s (EEOC) memo on “Enforcement Protections for LGBT
Workers” provides an example of this practice. The memo lists numerous
cases as examples illustrating the protections for LGBT workers.47 While
these cases illustrate the protections for gay and transgender plaintiffs,
none involve bisexual plaintiffs.48 In another EEOC memo that lists
eighteen cases of “Recent EEOC Litigation Regarding Title VII & LGBTRelated Discrimination,” lesbian, gay, and transgender plaintiffs are well
represented; meanwhile, not a single case involving bisexual plaintiffs are
provided.49
An analysis of cases involving LGBT plaintiffs demonstrates that even
in the legal system, bisexual individuals face misconceptions as to their
sexual orientation—and challenges as to whether there exists a bisexual
orientation. LGBT case law also demonstrates bisexual erasure by
sometimes explicitly excluding bisexuals from LGBT consideration.
Apilado v. North American Gay Amateur Athletic Alliance (NAGAAA) is
a prominent case involving bisexual plaintiffs.50 It also illustrates the
“double discrimination” experienced by bisexual individuals as it involves
45

Searches of all federal courts were performed on May 15, 2020; “bisexual rights”
returned four cases while “gay rights” returned 329 cases. Westlaw search for “bisexual
rights” (May 15, 2020) (on file with author); Westlaw search for “gay rights” (May 15,
2020) (on file with author).
46
Double discrimination is when bisexuals are discriminated against by both
heterosexuals and homosexuals. See Robyn Ochs, Biphobia: It Goes More Than Two Ways,
https://robynochs.com/biphobia-it-goes-more-than-two-ways/ (last visited May 7, 2020).
47
What You Should Know: The EEOC and the Enforcement Protections for LGBT
Workers,
EQUAL
EMP.
OPPORTUNITY
COMMISSION
(May
4,
2015),
https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/what-you-should-know-eeoc-and-enforcementprotections-lgbt-workers.
48
Id.
49
Fact Sheet: Recent EEOC Litigation Regarding Title VII & LGBT-Related
Discrimination, EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION (July 8, 2016),
https://www.eeoc.gov/fact-sheet-recent-eeoc-litigation-regarding-title-vii-lgbt-relateddiscrimination.
50
Apilado v. N. Am. Gay Amateur Athletic All., 792 F. Supp. 2d 1151 (W.D. Wash.
2011).

40

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI RACE & SOCIAL JUSTICE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 11:1

discrimination by gay individuals against bisexual individuals. The case
involved a gay softball league that interrogated bisexual players with
intrusive questions about their sexual orientation.51 Because of this
questioning, the team with the bisexual players were forced to forfeit and
stripped of their second-place finish in the world series.52 This is despite
the explicit statement that the league was to promote the participation of
bisexuals.53 The court ruled in favor of NAGAAA—on First Amendment
freedom of association grounds—while avoiding the issue of how the
NAGAAA essentially refused to recognize the existence of bisexual
individuals by enforcing rules that labeled individuals as either
heterosexual or homosexual.54
Some cases have also exhibited gay and lesbian individuals presenting
their legal arguments in a way that delegitimizes bisexuality. In United
States v. Windsor,55 the plaintiff’s attorney made the strategic decision to
use the terms “gay marriage,” “straight marriage,” “marriages of gay
couples,” and “marriages of straight people.”56 This was reportedly based
on the determination that those terms are more associated with being
comfortable among gay and lesbian couples.57 However, when compared
to the more accurate terms of “same-sex marriage” and “different-sex
marriage,”58 the terminology used by the plaintiff’s attorney in Windsor.
The plaintiff’s attorney is exposed for suggesting that there are only the
binary groups of homosexual or heterosexual—thus ignoring the bisexual
orientation.59 Furthermore, the plaintiff’s attorney in Windsor felt it
necessary to point out that, despite Ms. Windsor being formerly married
to a man, she is a lesbian.60 The problem with such a statement is the
implication that if Ms. Windsor were bisexual, her right to same-sex
marriage would somehow be limited or weakened.61 This strategy is likely
51

Id. at 1159.
Tweedy & Yescavage, supra note 30, at 711–12.
53
Apilado, 792 F. Supp. 2d at 1159.
54
Tweedy & Yescavage, supra note 30, at 711–13.
55
570 U.S. 744 (2013).
56
Tweedy & Yescavage, supra note 30, at 714.
57
Id.
58
The terms “same-sex marriage” and “different-sex marriage” are more accurate than
the terms “gay marriage” and “straight marriage” because, technically, the issue in cases
such as Windsor the issue is whether two people of the same sex can get married, not
whether a person who is of the gay or lesbian sexual orientation can get married.
59
Tweedy & Yescavage, supra note 30, at 714.
60
Id. at 714–15. A similar occurrence happened in the California Proposition 8 case
where the plaintiff’s attorney felt it necessary to point out that the plaintiff, Sandy Stier,
was in fact a lesbian and not bisexual despite formerly being married to a man she claimed
to love. Id. at 715.
61
Id. at 715. This is not to say that the attorney representing Ms. Windsor is in any way
bi-phobic herself. Given the bi-phobic climate—even among many who support to be
52
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in part due to the fear that bisexuality challenges the immutability
characteristic of homosexuality, which is integral to pro-same-sex
marriage arguments.62
In 2016 Judge Posner criticized a judge for demonstrating a lack of
knowledge regarding the definition of bisexuality. “Apparently the
immigration judge does not know the meaning of bisexual,”63 Judge
Posner stated. Nevertheless, the very next year, Judge Posner defined
bisexuality as someone who has “both homosexual and heterosexual
orientations.”64 This definition is not only incorrect but harmful to the
bisexual cause as it reinforces the harmful belief that there are only two
sexual orientations and that those who identify as bisexual are simply
confused as to which one of these binary options they fit into.
Romer v. Evans65 serves as an excellent illustration as to how the law
often overlooks those who identify as bisexual. The case involved a
Colorado constitutional amendment that barred certain protections for
“homosexual, lesbian, or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or
relationships.”66 However, in the majority decision, Justice Kennedy
insisted on referring to the named class in the Colorado constitutional
amendment as “homosexual persons or gays and lesbians.”67
There is also evidence to suggest that bisexual individuals are
discriminated against in the immigration and asylum context. In a 2016
case, the Seventh Circuit was highly skeptical of a bisexual asylum
seeker’s claim that he was the victim of violent discrimination, despite
evidence supporting his claim.68 The immigration judge also appeared to
be skeptical of even the existence of bisexuality.69

LGBT supporters—this was likely a wise strategic decision for representing Ms. Windsor’s
interests. But the need for such a strategy does point to how bisexuals are ignored in sexual
orientation legal analysis.
62
Id. at 716.
63
Fuller v. Lynch, 833 F.3d 866, 879 (7th Cir. 2016).
64
Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., 853 F.3d 339, 355 (7th Cir. 2017), (Posner, J.,
concurring).
65
517 U.S. 620 (1996).
66
Id. at 620.
67
Id. at 624 (“It prohibits all legislative, executive or judicial action at any level of state
or local government designed to protect the named class, a class we shall refer to as
homosexual persons or gays and lesbians.”).
68
Fuller, 833 F.3d at 872 (Posner, J., dissenting).
69
The immigration judge seemed to be confused by how the asylum seeker produced
evidence of his former boyfriends while also being formerly married to a woman. Id. at
873–74.
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III. RELEVANT TITLE VII HISTORY
In 1964, Congress passed Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.70
Originally, the language of Title VII only included protections for
discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, and national origin.71
The addition of “sex” was later included on the final day of debate in the
House in an effort to make the bill “so controversial that eventually it
would be voted down . . ..”72 President Lyndon B. Johnson—whose
administration had opposed the addition of “sex” to the legislation—
signed the bill into law after the longest continuous filibuster in Senate
history.73 The text of Title VII does not explicitly make reference to sexual
orientation or gender identity.74 It is unlikely that, in 1964, the legislature
that passed Title VII intended for it to be applied to LGBT individuals—
especially considering that even the act of extending protections from
gender discrimination was so controversial.75 While LGBT individuals
continue to face unjust treatment in the twenty-first century, at the time the
bill was passed, gay and lesbian individuals were considered “presumptive
felons” and “literally, considered psychopaths, criminals, and enemies of
the people.”76
The history of Title VII adjudications is one of ever-increasing
liberality. The causation requirement has been relaxed and lessened.77 The
Act has been extended to include prohibitions on workplace sexual
harassment78 and then to workplace racial and national origin

70

42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17.
Turner, supra note 1, at 230.
72
Charles Whalen & Barbara Whalen, THE LONGEST DEBATE: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 116 (1985).
73
Turner, supra note 1, at 235.
74
What You Should Know, supra note 47 (“Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
does not explicitly include sexual orientation or gender identity in its list of protected
bases . . . .”).
75
See Whalen & Whalen, supra note 72.
76
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Title VII’s Statutory History and the Sex Discrimination
Argument for LGBT Workplace Protections, 127 YALE L.J. 322, 336, 333 (2017).
77
Turner, supra note 1, at 236. (“Beginning in 1991, Title VII plaintiffs alleging statusbased (race, color, religion, sex, or national origin) discrimination can satisfy a relaxed and
lessened causation standard by ‘show[ing] that the motive to discriminate was one of the
employer’s motives, even if the employer also had other, lawful motives which were
causative in the employer’s decision.’”) (quoting Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. V. Nassar,
570 U.S. 338, 343 (2013).
78
Ellen Frankel Paul, Sexual Harassment as Sex Discrimination: A Defective Paradigm,
8 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 333, 346 (1990) (“In all likelihood, the members of Congress
would have been quite surprised to learn that they had contemplated including sexual
harassment within the confines of sex discrimination—especially since the term ‘sexual
harassment’ did not come into currency until the late 1970s.”).
71
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harassment.79 The Act did not apply to associational race discrimination
claims until the 1980s80 and not in associational gender discrimination
claims until even more recently.81 The Act originally did not apply to
educational institutions or state and local governments.82 The Act currently
includes protections against pregnancy discrimination as a form of sex
discrimination, but it was not originally interpreted to do so.83 In Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, the Supreme Court extended Title VII “because
of . . . sex” protections to victims of gender stereotyping.84 In 1998 the
Supreme Court held that Title VII sex-based discrimination protections
extend to same-sex harassment.85 The EEOC has long held that Title VII
did not provide protections against sexual orientation discrimination86 but
currently maintains that it does.87 In 2015 the EEOC released a
memorandum stating that they “interpret[] and enforce[] Title VII’s
prohibition of sex discrimination as forbidding any employment
discrimination based on gender identity or sexual orientation.”88
In 2015, the Supreme Court in the landmark case of Obergefell v.
Hodges upheld the constitutional right to same sex marriage.89 This led to
79

Turner, supra note 1, at 239.
Andrew W. Powell, Is There a Future for Sex-Based Associational Discrimination
Claims Under Title VII?, 66 LAB. L.J. 164, 165–66 (2015).
81
Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 125 (2d Cir. 2018) (“We now hold that
the prohibition on associational discrimination applies with equal force to all the classes
protected by Title VII, including sex.”).
82
Carol Nackenoff, The Supreme Court Hears Arguments on the Meaning of “Sex
POL’Y
REP.
(Oct.
8,
2019),
Discrimination,”
GENDER
https://genderpolicyreport.umn.edu/meaning-of-sex-discrimination/.
83
Id.
84
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250 (1989).
85
Oncale v. Sundower Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 82 (1998).
86
Katherine Carter, Questioning the Definition of “Sex” in Title VII: Bostock v. Clayton
County, GA, 15 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y SIDEBAR 59, 72 (2020).
87
Sex-Based Discrimination, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,
https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/types/sex.cfm (last visited Mar. 15, 2020) (“Discrimination
against an individual because of . . . sexual orientation is discrimination because of sex in
violation of Title VII.”). Although, note that Attorney General Jeff Sessions responded to
this by claiming that “the EEOC is not speaking for the United States and its position about
the scope of Title VII is entitled to no deference beyond its power to persuade.” Nackenoff,
supra note 82.
88
What You Should Know, supra note 47. However, relevant to the theme of this Article,
the explanations provided by the EEOC as to how “sexual orientation” is protected under
Title VII seem to focus on lesbian, gay, and transgender individuals while omitting
protections for bisexual individuals. In the section “Examples of LGBT-Related Sex
Discrimination Claims,” multiple examples are provided for transgender discrimination.
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the Seventh Circuit pointing out in a Title VII discrimination case
involving a lesbian woman that “[Obergefell] creates a paradoxical legal
landscape in which a person can be married on Saturday and then fired on
Monday for just that act.”90
There is a current circuit split among federal appeals courts on this
issue.91 Twenty-one states and the District of Columbia expressly prohibit
sexual orientation discrimination.92 This is a hotly contested issue because
many states still have no legislation against sexual orientation employment
discrimination.93 In these states, Title VII is the only available safeguard
against sexual orientation discrimination.94

IV. DISCRIMINATION “BECAUSE OF . . . SEX”95
One of the three main arguments presented in favor of including gay
and lesbian individuals in Title VII employment discrimination protection
claims is that the discrimination is ultimately because of sex.96 For
purposes of potential application to bisexual individuals, it is important to
distinguish the method by which this theory would protect gay and lesbian
individuals from discrimination. It does not add sexual orientation to the
statute’s enumerated protected classes of race, color, religion, sex, and
national origin. As the Seventh Circuit pointed out, “[o]bviously that lies
beyond our power.”97 Rather, the courts that have interpreted Title VII’s
“because of . . . sex” provision to protect gay and lesbian claimants from
employment discrimination have done so by viewing their mistreatment
as a form of sex discrimination. This is consistent with the EEOC’s
position that, in federal employment, their decisions regarding extending
Title VII protections to LGBT individuals does not involve “recogniz[ing]
any new protected characteristics under Title VII. Rather [the EEOC] has
90
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applied existing Title VII precedents to sex discrimination claims raised
by LGBT individuals.”98
This distinction may not be highly relevant to gay and lesbian
individuals who have been discriminated against, since the end result is
the same—the presence or absence of a legal recourse. However, for
bisexual individuals this distinction could ultimately result in no
protection at all. Adding “sexual orientation” to the enumerated list of
protected classifications would clearly provide protections for bisexual
individuals. But it is not clear that the reliance on a theory of
discrimination “because of . . . sex” will result in the same protections.
The standard argument for protecting gay and lesbian individuals from
discrimination under Title VII involves considering the employer’s likely
response to the same actions if performed by an employee of the opposite
sex. As the petitioner’s attorney in Bostock summarized in her first
sentence at oral argument, “[w]hen an employer fires a male employee for
dating men but does not fire a female employee who dates men, he violates
Title VII.”99 For example, if Bostock—a gay man who was fired for being
sexually attracted to men—would have been female and sexually attracted
to men, there would have been no firing. Therefore, Bostock’s firing was
literally “because of . . . sex.”
However, the gender discrimination that is so obvious in Bostock is
less clear when applied to a similarly situated bisexual individual. This is
because considering the gender of a bisexual employee would not
necessarily lead to different behavior on the part of the employer. Consider
the previous rationale for why firing a gay male employee is sex
discrimination. It was because a female employee who engaged in the
exact same behavior would not be fired. But an employer could likely
maintain that if the gender of a male bisexual employee who was fired
were switched to female, this would equally lead to a firing. In this way,
even if the Supreme Court holds that Bostock was a victim of gender
discrimination and therefore protected under Title VII, courts could
nevertheless maintain that bisexual employment discrimination is not
protected under Title VII.
Note that this hypothetical employer who presents the defense that he
equally discriminates against male and female bisexual employees is
distinct from the argument provided by the employer in Zarda: that an
employer who fires gay men and lesbian women alike cannot be said to be
discriminating on the basis of sex because “[n]either sex is favored over
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the other.”100 This latter line of reasoning is easily refuted because the
sexual partners of a gay man and a lesbian woman are different. Namely,
the former are male and the latter are female. Thus, this argument provided
by the employer in Zarda would not negate the claim that he is engaging
in gender discrimination. This employer is simply providing an additional
example of how he would also unlawfully discriminate against a lesbian
woman.101 However, with the bisexual male employee, the sexual partners
would be indistinguishable—by gender—with those of a bisexual female
employee.
A similar argument from the petitioners in Bostock involves the act of
defining “homosexual.” The petitioner’s brief in Bostock argues that one
cannot define “homosexual” without first taking into account an
individual’s sex.102 Webster’s dictionary defines “homosexual” as “of,
relating to, or characterized by a tendency to direct sexual desire toward
another of the same sex.”103 Therefore, in order to categorize someone as
homosexual, one must first take into consideration his or her sex.
However, “bisexual” is defined as “of, relating to, or characterized by a
tendency to be sexually attracted toward individuals of both sexes . . . .”104
While this definition of “bisexual” does refer to sex, it is not in the same
context as the definition of “homosexual.” Namely, one is not required to
know the sex of the individual to accurately identify him or her as bisexual.
It is enough to know that the individual is sexually attracted to males and
females. Conversely, if one only knows that someone is attracted to males,
one must ascertain that person’s sex before being able to identify the
individual as homosexual.

V. GENDER STEREOTYPING DISCRIMINATION
The second theory offered to extend Title VII protections to gay and
lesbian individuals from employment discrimination is that the practice
ultimately functions as a form of gender stereotyping discrimination. In
the 1982 case Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, the Supreme Court held that
100
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gender stereotyping violated Title VII protections.105 The case involved a
female employee who was denied a promotion because she was, among
other things, too “macho.”106 Using language highly relevant to gay
plaintiffs such as Bostock, the Court in Price Waterhouse explained the
requirement of the causal relationship between the employer’s gender
stereotyping and the employee’s harm:
In saying that gender played a motivating part in an employment
decision, we mean that, if we asked the employer at the moment of the
decision what its reasons were . . . one of those reasons would be that the
applicant or employee was a woman. In the specific context of sex
stereotyping, an employer who acts on the basis of a belief that a woman
cannot be aggressive, or that she must not be, has acted on the basis of
gender.107
Later in the opinion, the Court more succinctly summed up the issue
as, “in sex-based terms would [the employer] have criticized her as sharply
(or criticized her at all) if she had been a man.”108 It is easy to see how this
Price Waterhouse standard could lead to the conclusion that
discrimination against a gay male employee is a form of gender
stereotyping—the stereotype that males should be in romantic
relationships with females—and therefore violate Title VII’s protection
against gender discrimination. However, it is harder to see how this
standard would lead to Title VII protections against a similarly situated
bisexual employee. An employer who fired a male, bisexual employee
solely because he was bisexual could potentially pass the Price
Waterhouse standard. As such, the employer’s actions would not
necessarily involve the practice of gender stereotyping.109
A claim of gender stereotyping by a bisexual plaintiff is further
complicated when one considers the subjective practice of considering
behavior to be stereotypically “gay” or “bisexual.” In Prowel v. Wise
Business Forms, Inc., the court recognized that Prowel, a gay man, was
harmed because he demonstrated numerous gay stereotypes.110 These
included speaking with a high voice, walking femininely, sitting “the way
a woman would sit,” wearing “dressy clothes,” and pressing buttons on a
105
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piece of machinery “with pizzazz.”111 The plaintiff received protection
because the court was able to ascertain that these behaviors are generally
identified as stereotypically “gay.”112 However, stereotypical bisexual
behavior is less universally agreed upon—and therefore bisexual
individuals would be less likely to receive protections from courts under
this theory.
This is not to say a Supreme Court holding that gay and lesbian
employees receive Title VII protections on a theory of gender stereotype
discrimination would be detrimental to bisexual advocates. Such a
Supreme Court holding would just not necessarily apply to a similarly
situated bisexual employee. It would still be a significant step toward
bisexual individuals receiving Title VII protections. In the event of such a
Supreme Court ruling, advocates could attempt to analogize the gender
stereotypes involved in bisexual discrimination to those involved in gay
and lesbian discrimination. As the district court pointed out in Zarda—a
case involving a gay male employee—”[t]he gender stereotype at work
here is that ‘real’ men should date women, and not other men.”113 While
bisexual men do not violate this gender stereotype to the extent that a gay
man does—bisexual men do conform to the first part of dating women—
they do violate the second part of the stereotype by dating men. Therefore,
a future case involving a male bisexual plaintiff could attempt to isolate
the issue to his intimate relationship with men. After all, the male partners
are likely the sole reason for the discrimination since without them the
male employee would be left with only female partners. In this way, a
Supreme Court precedent applying Title VII protections to gay and lesbian
individuals on a gender stereotyping theory would not necessarily be
interpreted to apply protections to bisexual individuals, but it would
provide beneficial case law that currently does not exist.

VI. ASSOCIATIONAL DISCRIMINATION
The third and final theory offered to extend Title VII employment
protections to gay and lesbian individuals is that of associational
discrimination. Associational discrimination occurs when someone is
discriminated against due to his association or relationship to a third
person who the employer disapproves of.114 The text of Title VII “contains
111
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no express prohibition against associational discrimination . . . .”115
However, associational discrimination claims began to be read into Title
VII by the courts in the 1980s.116 Initially these claims were mostly limited
to associations based on race,117 but in the 2018 case of Zarda, the district
court held that protection from associational discrimination applies to all
the enumerated classes in Title VII.118
In associational discrimination cases, the employee (associator) is not
viewed as being harmed because of the employer’s animosity toward his
own characteristics.119 Rather, it is the characteristics of the third party he
is associating with that the employer has animosity toward, and therefore
results in harm to the employee.120 This standard likely results in a bisexual
individual having a more difficult time than a gay or lesbian person in
prevailing on a Title VII associational discrimination claim. To illustrate,
imagine the following two discriminatory actions involving a gay
employee and a bisexual employee:
(1) The employer fires George, a gay employee, solely because
George is gay.
(2) The employer fires Brett, a bisexual employee, solely because
Brett is bisexual.
George could make an associational discrimination case that he was
fired because of the employer’s animosity toward the gender of his sexual
partners. Namely, if George’s sexual partners were female, he would not
have been fired. It was only because they were male that George was fired.
However, a similar associational discrimination claim by Brett would
not be so clear. Note that in George’s example the employer’s animosity
toward the third party is not considered to be based on the third party’s
sexual orientation. Rather, it is considered to be based on the third party’s
gender. However, in Brett’s case the employer could claim that it was not
the gender of any individual third party that was the cause of the firing.
Rather, it was the act of Brett engaging in sexual relationships with both
males and females. In other words, if the Supreme Court extends Title VII
protections to gay and lesbian individuals based on a theory of gender115
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based associational discrimination, the same logic would not necessarily
protect bisexual individuals. Brett’s employer could claim that he has no
issue with a male employee having intimate relationships with either
males or females. The bisexual practice of having intimate relationships
with both males and females that is the issue—and thus Brett was
discriminated against based on his sexual orientation and not based on the
gender of his romantic partners. The third party in an associational
discrimination cause of action must be a part of a specifically enumerated
“protected class,” such as race or sex.121 Sexual orientation is not one of
the enumerated protected classes.
In such a case, Brett’s best associational discrimination argument
would likely involve parsing out his sexual partners and focusing solely
on the males. In this way he could claim that his employer is showing
animosity toward these male partners on the basis of their gender. After
all, if those men were women—and therefore all of Brett’s sexual partners
were women—the employer would not have fired Brett. But this produces
a more convoluted associational discrimination argument than the one
available to George. Based on current jurisprudence, George’s more
straightforward argument already stretches Title VII protections further
than the Supreme Court has allowed. While Brett’s argument is not a giant
leap from George’s, it is far from the language of Title VII, which does
not even explicitly allow associational discrimination claims on any
grounds.122
The issue for Brett could become even more difficult to prevail on if
he were bisexual but—during the time of his employment—only engaged
in intimate relationships with females, or did not engage in any intimate
relationships at all. If Brett was fired for being bisexual, it is even more
clear that it was only because of his bisexuality and not because of any
characteristic of his partner(s). In this scenario, there is a complete lack of
any association whereby an associative discrimination claim could be
rooted.
The good news for bisexual rights advocates is that there is a clear
trend in district courts extending the scope of associational discrimination
claims. Originally this cause of action was not available in any cases.123
Then, it only applied in race-based cases.124 In 2007 the idea of genderbased associational discrimination was “a novel theory.”125 In 2009 it
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“[lacked] precedential support.”126 In 2010 it was “an unsettled legal
question,”127 and in 2018 the Second Circuit held that it “applied with
equal force to all the classes protected by Title VII.”128

VII. CONCLUSION
Many legal scholars view the LGBTQ+ community as a conglomerate
where a Supreme Court victory providing employment protections from
discrimination for some would necessarily provide protections for all. As
demonstrated in this Article, that is not necessarily accurate. The three
arguments for extending Title VII gender protections to gay and lesbian
individuals do not perfectly translate to protections for bisexual
individuals. Compared to a case involving discrimination against a gay or
lesbian employee, it is a more tenuous connection to show that
discrimination against a bisexual employee was “because of . . . sex.”
Likewise, it would be more difficult for a bisexual employee to show that
he was discriminated against based on gender stereotyping than a gay or
lesbian employee. Finally, the nature of associational discrimination
claims results in that theory more easily applying to a gay or lesbian
employee than a bisexual employee.
A Supreme Court win for the petitioners in Bostock would still be good
for bisexual advocates. But it is far from clear that it would automatically
provide the same protections for bisexual individuals as it would for gay
and lesbian individuals. The petitioner’s attorney in Bostock even
explicitly stated that Title VII should not “encompass sexual orientation
discrimination”129 and instead provided a gender-based rationale that does
not necessarily apply to bisexual individuals.130 How the Court crafts its
opinion in Bostock could provide clues as to how bisexual advocates
should move forward to secure the protections enjoyed by gay and lesbian
individuals. No matter what the outcome in Bostock and future LGBT
cases, it is important not to engage in the practice of bisexual erasure
analyzed in this Article by neglecting to consider how legal outcomes will
affect the bisexual community specifically.
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